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Primary law of the European Union demands that the allocation of the seats of the 
European Parliament between the Member States must obey the principle of degressive 
proportionality.  The principle embodies the political aim that the more populous states 
agree to be underrepresented in order to allow the less populous states to be better 
represented.  This paper reviews four allocation methods achieving this goal: the 
Cambridge Compromise, the Power Compromise, the Modified Cambridge 
Compromise, and the 0.5-DPL Method.  After a year of committee deliberations, 
Parliament decreed on 7 February 2018 an allocation of seats for the 2019 elections 
that realizes degressive proportionality, but otherwise lacks methodological grounding. 
The allocation emerged from haggling and bargaining behind closed doors. 
1. Introduction 
In the past the seats of the European Parliament (EP) were allocated between the 
Member States following a strategy of an ever enlarging parliament.  Whenever a state 
acceded to the European Union, its seats were created from scratch and added to the extant 
total.  The generous practice of creating new seats evaded the delicate task of transferring 
seats from one Member State to another one.  However, the strategy has come to an end due 
to the Treaty of Lisbon.  The Treaty limits the size of the EP to at most 751 seats.   
With a parliament of limited size future allocations of EP seats will make seat transfers 
between Member States unavoidable.  Moreover the current issue is not the accession of a 
new state, but the secession of an old state: the Brexit.  This secession raises the question of 
what to do with the 73 UK seats that will become vacant upon Brexit.   
The situation forces the EP to review its approach to the allocation of seats between the 
Member States of the Union.  To this end the Constitutional Affairs Committee of the EP 
(AFCO, from French: affaires constitutionnels) conducted a workshop entitled ‘The Com-
position of the European Parliament’ in January 2017; the briefings are published in Direc-
torate-General (2017).   
The starting point for the workshop was the European Council (2013) decision for 
establishing the composition of the EP.  Art. 4 says that the decision shall be revised before 
the end of 2016, with the aim of establishing a system to allocate the seats between Member 
States in an objective, fair, durable and transparent way: 
This Decision shall be revised sufficiently far in advance of the beginning of the 2019–2024 parliamen-
tary term on the basis of an initiative of the European Parliament presented before the end of 2016 with 
the aim of establishing a system which in future will make it possible, before each fresh election to the 
European Parliament, to allocate the seats between Member States in an objective, fair, durable and 
transparent way, translating the principle of degressive proportionality as laid down in Article 1, taking 
account of any change in their number and demographic trends in their population, as duly ascertained 
thus respecting the overall balance of the institutional system as laid down in the Treaties. 
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Part 1 of this paper details the legal ramifications promoting, and delimiting, degressivi-
ty.  Part 2 reviews the four allocation methods presented to AFCO during the January 2017 
workshop.  Part 3 comments on the final act of decision-making.  Another two methods 
entered the stage, though neither met with AFCO’s approval. 
In the end AFCO decreed a composition of the 2019 EP elections that emerged from 
deliberations behind closed doors.  It satisfies degressivity, but loses the link to direct 
representation of the Union citizens.  In their debates neither AFCO nor the EP cared to 
enlighten the public how they arrived at their conclusion.  Their motives remain obscure.  
Parliament missed this opportunity to proceed from the dark ages to an era of enlightenment. 
2. Degressive Representation 
The oxymoron of degressive proportionality has an enthusiastic tradition in the debates 
of the EP.  However, the term calls for an explanation. Just as one may have degressive 
taxation, proportional taxation, or progressive taxation, one may also have degressive 
representation, proportional representation, or progressive representation.  Taken literally 
degressive proportionality is a paradoxical compound.  Instead we prefer to speak of de-
gressive representation, which is the concept really meant, or degressivity, for short. 
A parliamentary resolution of 2007 (European Parliament 2008) interprets degressivity 
to be a manifestation of solidarity: 
The more populous states agree to be underrepresented in order to allow the less populous states to be 
represented better. 
The resolution includes an attempt of a formal specification of degressivity which has 
since been recognized as a potential contradiction.  Meanwhile the abstract principle has been 
given a concrete specification capable of practical implementation.  The specification is part 
of the secondary Union law (requirement 10 below).   
Before turning to secondary law, we begin our discussion of degressivity and the other 
ramifications of EP elections by listing the requirements of primary Union law. 
2.1. Requirements of Primary Union Law 
The Union’s primary law is set forth in the Treaty on European Union (TEU, Lisbon 
Treaty); see European Union (2012).  It lays conditions upon possible methods of allocating 
the seats of the EP between the Member States.  Of particular relevance are the following 
requirements which we rearrange and paraphrase to ease cross-referencing in this paper: 
1. Citizens are directly represented in the EP (Art. 10(2) TEU). 
2. The EP shall be composed of representatives of the Union’s citizens (Art. 14(2) TEU). 
3. Representation of citizens shall be degressively proportional (Art. 14(2) TEU). 
4. The size of the EP shall not exceed 751 seats (Art. 14(2) TEU). 
5. Every Member State shall be allocated at least 6 seats (Art. 14(2) TEU). 
6. Every Member State shall be allocated at most 96 seats (Art. 14(2) TEU). 
There is a tension between the principles of direct representation (requirement 1) and of 
degressive representation (requirement 3), each of which is stipulated by primary Union law.  
Requirement 1 supports an allocation proportional to population no matter how populous a 
state is.  Requirement 3 favours an allocation giving some priority to smaller states.  The 
composition that is eventually realized must pay due attention to both principles, and strike a 
gentle balance between them. 
There is a potential ambiguity in the term Member State over whether it refers to 
government or to people.  When Member State is interpreted to mean government, the 
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appropriate representative bodies are the European Council and the Council, by Art. 10(2) 
TEU, rather than the EP.  Within the context of the composition of the EP, the term Member 
State means people; that is, a Member State’s citizenry. 
Moreover the notion of degressivity is sensitive to the meanings of the term citizens in 
requirements 2 and 3.  The meanings differ significantly even though both requirements 
appear in the same section of Art. 14 TEU.  Reference to Union citizens (requirement 2) 
promises to place all citizens on an equal footing.  However, the principle of degressivity 
(requirement 3) discriminates between citizens according to Member States.  The citizens of 
more populous Member States agree to be underrepresented in order to allow the citizens of 
less populous Member States to be represented better. 
2.2. Requirements of Secondary Union Law 
The extended deliberations of the EP on its composition have led to specifications that 
have found their way into Art. 1 of the European Council (2013) decision: 
7. Any more populous Member State shall be allocated at least as many seats as any less populous 
Member State. 
8. The least populous Member State shall be allocated 6 seats. 
9. The most populous Member State shall be allocated 96 seats. 
10. The principle of degressive proportionality shall require decreasing representation ratios when passing 
from a more populous Member State to a less populous Member State, where the representation ratio of a 
Member State is defined to be the ratio of its population figure relative to its number of seats before 
rounding. 
Requirements 8 and 9, as reasoned by Council, allow to reflect as closely as possible the 
spectrum of the Member States’ population figures.  This reasoning can be met with the cur-
rent data, but is invalid in general.  If Germany’s population were drastically smaller, or if a 
state of the size of Germany (like Turkey) were acceding, 96 seats might be too many even 
for the most populous Member State 
Requirement 10 provides an operational specification of degressivity requiring that the 
representation ratios are decreasing when passing from a larger state to a smaller state.  Our 
Tables 1 and 2 below exhibit columns whose labels include “RR” – short for representation 
ratio – in witness of degressivity as thus specified. 
2.3. Population Figures 
Available population figures are those used for the qualified majority voting (QMV) 
rule in the Council of Ministers.  Presumably everybody would endorse the aim that each 
individual who qualifies (in some way) as a Union citizen shall be counted at least once and at 
most once.  That is, he or she is counted exactly once.  This modest aim is not achieved easi-
ly, considering that the data are gathered by a host of domestic statistical offices before being 
communicated to EuroStat.  To this end it seems appropriate to continue to base all population 
figures on the internationally (UN) approved notion of total resident population.  These are 
the population figures collected by EuroStat for the application of Council’s QMV rule. 
Since the Council and the EP are constitutional organs with joint governance 
responsibility, the two institutions ought to employ the same population data.  The population 
figures for Council’s QMV rule during the calendar year 2017 are published by European 
Council (2016).  They provide the input data for Table 1 (column “QMV2017”) as well as for 
Table 2 (which table, for lack of space, shows output only). 
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3. The Four Workshop Proposals 
During the January 2017 AFCO workshop four allocation methods were presented 
which are here reviewed only briefly; for proper details see Directorate General (2017).  Re-
grettably none of these methods met with acceptance by AFCO. 
3.1. Cambridge Compromise 
The Cambridge Compromise of Grimmett et al. (2011) may be paraphrased as follows: 
Every Member State is assigned a common number of base seats.  The remaining seats are allocated 
proportionately to population figures, using the divisor method with upward rounding and subject to a 
maximum allocation of 96 seats. 
The Cambridge Compromise achieves degressivity without distorting the meaning of 
“citizens” beyond the minimum.  It does so in each of its two stages.  The first stage of 
assigning base seats treats all Member States alike.  This is extremely degressive since it 
neglects population figures entirely.  The second stage of proportional allocation of the 
remaining seats embodies a mild form of degressivity through the use of upward rounding.  
Upward rounding is known to introduce a slight bias in favour of the less populous states and 
at the expense of more populous states (Pukelsheim 2017; Chap. 7).  This type of bias 
reinforces degressive effects. 
The Cambridge Compromise results in an increased bunching of Member States near 
the maximum of 96 seats (as permitted by requirement 9).  This does not threaten degressivi-
ty, yet it disadvantages capped Member State relative to other large states. 
Typically, when compared to the 2014 status quo seat allocation, Member States in the 
top and bottom thirds would gain seats (or stay as is), while middle-sized Member States 
would lose seats (or stay as is).  The loss of seats constitutes a major political obstacle that 
opposes the suitability of the Cambridge Compromise for EU-27 in its present configuration. 
3.2. Power Compromise 
The Power Compromise of Grimmett, Oelbermann and Pukelsheim (2012) is a variant 
of the Cambridge Compromise operating on power-adjusted population units rather than on 
original population figures.  It may be worded as follows: 
Every Member State is assigned a common number of base seats.  The remaining seats are allocated 
proportionately to adjusted population units (that is, the population figures raised to a common power) 
using the divisor method with upward rounding.  The number of base seats, the power, and the divisor are 
determined so that the least populous state is allocated 6 seats, the most populous state is allocated just 96 
seats, and the preordained EP seat total is fully utilized. 
The Power Compromise is complicated by involving an additional parameter: the 
power.  Generally there is a range of powers that guarantee 96 seats for the most populous 
state; it can be shown that in such cases the smallest power achieves the highest level of 
degressivity.  An efficient algorithm to determine the power parameter is described in 
Grimmett, Oelbermann and Pukelsheim (2012) or in Pukelsheim (2017: Sect. 12.9). 
It transpires that, with an EP size of 723 seats or more, no Member State has to 
relinquish any of its 2014 seats.  That is, a total of 723 seats is the minimum EP size for which 
the Power Compromise realizes a no-loss seat allocation such that every Member State meets 
or exceeds its 2014 seat contingent. 
However, the Power Compromise achieves degressivity by interpreting the term “citi-
zens” in a rather broad sense.  The method replaces lucent population figures, which count 
concrete citizens, by obscure population units, which measure abstract units.  For example 
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Malta’s population of 434 403 citizens would be transformed to 38 336 population units.  
Does this mean that less than ten percent of the citizenry is accounted for?  Or less than ten 
per cent of each citizen?  Neither interpretation seems profitable; the interim power-adjust-
ments remain dubious.  Their justification lies in the final result which thereby achieves a 
higher degree of degressivity. 
The Cambridge Compromise may be viewed as prioritizing direct representation over 
degressivity.  In contrast, the Power Compromise allows greater degressivity, but at some cost 
to direct representation.  The two methods yield seat allocations that become increasingly 
identical as the power parameter moves closer to unity.  They coincide when the power equals 
unity, and this could occur in the future.  This possibility of future coincidence of the two 
methods mitigates the marginal disregard by the Power Compromise of the principle of direct 
representation. 
3.3. Modified Cambridge Compromise 
The procedure proposed by Słomczyński and Życzkowski (2012), called Modified 
Cambridge Compromise, is akin to the Power Compromise.  It relies on population trans-
formations that depend on a power parameter d.  The transformation of a state with popula-
tion p is defined to be 
 96 (𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑 − 434 404𝑑𝑑) + 6 (82 064 489𝑑𝑑 − 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑)82 064 489𝑑𝑑 − 434 404𝑑𝑑 . 
By way of standardization the transformation involves the smallest and largest population 
figures: 434 404 of Malta and 82 064 489 of Germany, and the smallest and largest admis-
sible seat numbers: 6 and 96.  The procedure converts the transformed quantities into whole 
numbers of seats using the rule of standard rounding.  The power parameter is determined so 
that the sum of all seat numbers exhausts the preordained seat total. 
Specifically, the authors find the minimum EP size for a no-loss seat allocation to be 
721 seats.  This EP size conforms well to the minimum size of 723 seats that are required for 
a no-loss seat allocation when using the Power Compromise. 
3.4. 0.5-DPL Method 
Yet another procedure that was presented in the workshop is called the 0.5-DPL 
Method.  The name includes DP to point to degressive proportionality, while L is reminiscent 
of the limitations due to the minimum requirement of 6 seats and the maximum capping of 96 
seats.  The approach originates from the work of Ramírez, Palomares and Márquez (2006). 
The 0.5-DPL Method is based on adjusted quotas.  The adjusted quota is a sum of two 
terms.  The first term is 0.5 times the population figure divided by the sum of all population 
figures.  The second term is 0.5 times the square-root population divided by the sum of all 
square-root populations.  With reference to the adjusted quotas, the divisor method with 
upward rounding is used for the allocation of the given seat total. 
The 0.5-DPL Method fails to realize a no-loss allocation, but not as violently as the 
Cambridge Compromise.  The state that continues to be deficient with regard to the 2014 
status quo is Lithuania.  Compared to its 11 seats in 2014, Lithuania falls short of at least two 
seats up to EP size 729, while EP sizes from 730 through 751 feature a one-seat deficit. 
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4. AFCO Deliberations and EP Resolution 
The January 2017 workshop on the composition of the EP was followed by a period of 
silence.  The two rapporteurs on the dossier, Danuta Maria Hübner (EPP - PL, AFCO presi-
dent) and Pedro Silva Pereira (S&D - PT), worked behind the scenes to explore feasible 
options with the shadow rapporteurs from the Political Groups in the EP.  In April 2017 the 
two rapporteurs issued a working paper, and in September 2017 a draft report.  Consideration 
of the draft report in AFCO sessions was repeatedly postponed, reflecting the challenge of 
reaching a compromise able to attract majority support.  Eventually, in January 2018, the 
AFCO adopted the report Hübner and Silva Pereira (2018).  The proposed composition of the 
EP for the legislative period 2019−2024 is shown in column “2019” of Table 2.  In the sequel 
we summarise the route taken to this composition. 
4.1. A Midsummer’s Wish List 
During the summer of 2017 AFCO signalled interest in a model devised to meet the 
following criteria: 
• No Member State loses any seats. 
• There is respect for degressivity (as specified in requirement 10 above). 
• A parliament should have either 700 and 710 members. 
The participants of the January 2017 workshop responded with two notes.  Grimmett et 
al. (2017) suggested a no-loss variant of the Cambridge Compromise (see Sect. 4.5 below), 
and Ramírez González (2017) proposed a variant of the 0.5-DPL procedure, namely the so-
called FPS method (Sect. 4.6).  Since the eventual AFCO resolution adopted a parliament of 
705 seats, we adopt similarly a house size of 705 in the subsequent analysis of this paper. 
4.2. The Impact of Brexit 
The impending Brexit played an unsurprisingly prominent role in the deliberations of 
the AFCO.  Indeed, there is evidence in the televised sessions of AFCO that speculation about 
Brexit featured at least as prominently in the discussion as did the issue of fair representation 
of half a billion Union citizens in the EP. 
The AFCO approached the issue of Brexit as follows.  In the (unlikely) event that the 
United Kingdom continues to be represented in the 2019–2024 EP, the current 2014 
composition will be maintained.  Otherwise, the 2019 composition will be implemented.  If 
the UK exodus takes place during the 2019–2024 legislation period, parliament will promptly 
switch from the 2014 composition to the 2019 composition.  For such a switch to be 
uncontroversial, it will be necessary that no Member State loses seats.  With a no-loss 2019 
allocation, the switch may be enacted by the simple mechanism of inviting new deputies into 
office, thus avoiding the collateral damage of eviction of incumbent Members of Parliament. 
The imperative of planning for Brexit provides justification for the no loss requirement, 
namely that every Member State has at least as many seats in the 2019 composition as in the 
existing 2014 composition.  Such a no-loss warranty has been warmly welcomed by the 
AFCO, since it counters political damage and disputation. 
4.3. Non-Degressivity of the 2014 Composition 
Unfortunately, the 2014 composition violates degressivity, and not just at one place but 
at no fewer than ten (see column “RR2014” of Table 1).  It would be absurd for the AFCO to 
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postulate degressivity as a conditio sine qua non, and then to adopt a “pragmatic” solution 
with multiple violations. 
This awkward failure was recognised by the AFCO, who agreed to remedy it by a 
judicious scattering of seats from the pot liberated by the departing United Kingdom, thereby 
raising pragmatism to a new level.  On close inspection of the status quo 2014 composition, it 
is easily seen that the seat contingents of ten Member States need to be raised by a total of 16 
seats in order to realize degressivity.  The resulting seat allocation is exhibited in column 
“2014DP” of Table 1, and it utilizes 694 seats. 
These 694 seats now take the role of minimum requirements, and each midsummer 
scenario is now feasible: a parliament of 700 members, as well as a parliament of 710 
members.  With no public hint of explanation, the AFCO has settled on 705. 
4.4. No-Loss Cambridge Compromise 
The No-Loss Cambridge Compromise is a variant of the Cambridge Compromise that 
incorporates the 2014DP allocation in the form of minimum requirements.  For an EP with a 
total of 705 seats it proceeds as follows: 
Every Member State is allocated five base seats, plus one seat per 870 000 citizens or part thereof, except 
when the 2014DP restriction warrants more seats or the 96 capping imposes fewer seats. 
The resulting allocation is displayed in column “NLCC” of Table 2.  The minimum 
requirement is active from Poland through to Lithuania, while the capping is active for 
Germany only; these cases are highlighted by a bullet (●).  It is straightforward to verify that 
this allocation obeys degressivity (not shown in Table 2). 
4.5. Fix-Proportional-Square-Root Method 
The Fix-Proportional-Square-Root method is a variant of the 0.5-DPL method.  The 
method starts by calculating certain indices termed FPS-scores.  The FPS-score of Member 
State i is given by the formula  3 + 374.4 𝑝𝑝i + 249.6 𝑞𝑞i  
The first number “3” signifies three base seats.1  This leaves 624 seats yet to be allocated, and 
these are split into two categories with sizes in proportions 60:40. The second term of the 
display concerns the first such group of size 60% × 624 = 374.4 seats, which are allocated 
to States in proportion to population figures.2  The third term concerns the remaining group of 
374.4 seats, which are allocated to States in proportion to the square roots of the population 
figures.3  The sum of the three ensuing quantities is called the FPS-score of State i. The 
number 3 of base seats is contingent on requirement 8 of Sect. 2.2. 
Unlike the 0.5-DPL method, which puts equal weight 0.5 on the proportional and 
square-root contributions, the Fix-Proportional-Square-Root method uses the weights 0.6 and 
0.4. 
The FPS-scores having been determined, one now allocates the 705 seats on the basis of 
the Member States’ FPS-scores using the divisor method with standard rounding (Webster 
method), except when the 2014DP restriction warrants more seats or the 96 capping imposes 
fewer seats.   
                                                   
1 The base seat total is 27 × 3 = 81, thus leaving 705 − 81 = 624 seats remaining for further consideration. 
2 Here pi = Pi/P+, where Pi is the QMV2017 population figure of Member State i, and P+ = P1 + … + P27. 
3 Here qi = Qi/Q+, where Qi is the square root of the QMV2017 population figure of Member State i,  
and Q+ = Q1 + … + Q27. 
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The resulting seat allocation is exhibited in column “FPS” in Table 2.  The minimum 
requirement is active for Poland, from the Czech Republic through to Bulgaria, and for 
Lithuania, as indicated by a bullet (●).  The 96 capping is dormant.  It is straightforward to 
verify that this allocation obeys degressivity (not shown in Table 2). 
4.6. The 2019 Composition 
The 2019 composition (column “2019” in Table 2) that emerged finally after lengthy 
AFCO deliberations appears to be a deus ex machina.  The allocation satisfies the requirement 
of degressivity, as verified in the column labelled “RR2019”.  In other regards it stands 
isolated. Unlike the two compositions described above, it conforms to neither formula nor 
methodological procedure.  No justification for the composition has been forthcoming from 
either rapporteurs or speakers as to (i) why the AFCO resolved on a parliament size of 705 
seats, and (ii) why the eleven extra seats were allocated to some Member States and denied to 
others.   
It appears to the current authors that the Members of the European Parliament may have 
overlooked their obligation to justify to the Union citizens the rules which govern their 
representation.  Gray and Stubb (2001) reported from the negotiations in Council during the 
2000 Intergovernmental Conference in Nice that, in the final hours, “the Presidency handed 
out seats like loose change”.  We are left in the dark whether such standards were in operation 
during the recent AFCO deliberations. 
5. Conclusion 
The AFCO was under an obligation to agree a process which is objective, fair, durable 
and transparent (see Sect. 1). It has not met this obligation, beyond achieving degressivity.  
There may be some fear in the AFCO that, once a mathematical formula is adopted, it cannot 
then be varied.  This is, of course, false.  The United States of America experimented with 
many different apportionment methods before they decided in 1941, following a century and a 
half of experience, to codify such a system into law.  The AFCO and the EP are overdue on 
this obligation to democracy. 
In its plenary session of 7 February 2018, the EP agreed to the 2019 composition 
proposed by the AFCO, and forwarded it to the European Council (European Parliament 
2018).  According to Art. 14(2) TEU, the European Council is asked to adopt the proposition 
by unanimity.  Finally, the EP is expected to give its consent and to close the dossier; see Duff 
(2018) for more details. 
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Table 1:  Augmentation of the 2014 composition to achieve degressivity 
 
QMV2017 2014 RR2014 Augm. 2014DP RR2014DP 
Germany 82 064 489 96 854 838 0 96 854 838 
France 66 661 621 74 *900 833 4 78 854 636 
Italy 61 302 519 73 839 761 0 73 839 761 
Spain 46 438 422 54 *859 971 2 56 829 258 
Poland 37 967 209 51 744 455 0 51 744 455 
Romania 19 759 968 32 617 499 0 32 617 499 
The Netherlands 17 235 349 26 *662 898 2 28 615 548 
Belgium 11 289 853 21 537 612 0 21 537 612 
Greece 10 793 526 21 513 977 0 21 513 977 
Czech Republic 10 445 783 21 497 418 0 21 497 418 
Portugal 10 341 330 21 492 444 0 21 492 444 
Sweden 9 998 000 20 *499 900 1 21 476 095 
Hungary 9 830 485 21 468 118 0 21 468 118 
Austria 8 711 500 18 *483 972 1 19 458 500 
Bulgaria 7 153 784 17 420 811 0 17 420 811 
Denmark 5 700 917 13 *438 532 1 14 407 208 
Finland 5 465 408 13 †420 416 1 14 390 386 
Slovakia 5 407 910 13 †415 993 1 14 386 279 
Ireland 4 664 156 11 *424 014 2 13 358 781 
Croatia 4 190 669 11 †380 970 1 12 349 222 
Lithuania 2 888 558 11 262 596 0 11 262 596 
Slovenia 2 064 188  8 258 024 0 8 258 024 
Latvia 1 968 957  8 246 120 0 8 246 120 
Estonia 1 315 944  6 219 324 0 6 219 324 
Cyprus 848 319  6 141 387 0 6 141 387 
Luxembourg 576 249  6 96 042 0 6 96 042 
Malta 434 403  6 72 401 0 6 72 401 
Sum 445 519 516 678 —     16 694 —     
 
Notes: 
Population figures “QMV2017”: 
Column “QMV2017” contains the population figures that are used for Council’s qualified 
majority voting system during the calendar year 2017, as decreed in European Council (2016).  
Columns “2014” and “RR2014”: 
The representation ratio “RR2014” is the quotient of a Member State’s “QMV2017” population 
figure and its status quo “2014” composition, rounded to the nearest whole number. A repre-
sentation ratio that is larger than its predecessor constitutes a breach of degressivity; it is marked 
by an asterisk (*) or, when implied by preceding corrections, by a dagger (†). 
Columns “2014DP” and “RR2014DP”: 
The “Augm.” seats are augmenting the “2014” seats so that the resulting “2014DP” seats 
achieve degressivity.  That is, the representation ratios “RR2014DP” are decreasing when 
passing from a more populous Member State to a less populous Member State. 
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Table 2:  NLCC, FPS method, and 2019 composition 
 
2014DP NLCC FPS 2019 RR2019 Increm. 
Germany  96 ●96 96 96 854 838 0 
France 78 82 80 79 843 818 1 
Italy 73 76 75 76 806 612 3 
Spain 56 59 60 59 787 092 3 
Poland 51 ●51 51 52 730 139 1 
Romania 32 ●32 ●32 33 598 787 1 
The Netherlands 28 ●28 29 29 594 322 1 
Belgium 21 ●21 21 21 537 612 0 
Greece 21 ●21 21 21 513 977 0 
Czech Republic 21 ●21 ●21 21 497 418 0 
Portugal 21 ●21 ●21 21 492 444 0 
Sweden 21 ●21 ●21 21 476 095 0 
Hungary 21 ●21 ●21 21 468 118 0 
Austria 19 ●19 ●19 19 458 500 0 
Bulgaria 17 ●17 ●17 17 420 811 0 
Denmark 14 ●14 14 14 407 208 0 
Finland 14 ●14 14 14 390 386 0 
Slovakia 14 ●14 14 14 386 279 0 
Ireland 13 ●13 13 13 358 781 0 
Croatia 12 ●12 12 12 349 222 0 
Lithuania 11 ●11 ●11 11 262 596 0 
Slovenia 8 8 9 8 258 024 0 
Latvia 8 8 8 8 246 120 0 
Estonia 6 7 7 7 187 992 1 
Cyprus 6 6 6 6 141 387 0 
Luxembourg 6 6 6 6 96 042 0 
Malta 6 6 ●6 6 72 401 0 
Sum 694 705 705 705 —     11 
 
Notes: 
No-Loss Cambridge Compromise “NLCC”: 
Every Member State is allocated 5 base seats, plus one seat per 870 000 citizens or part thereof, 
except when the 2014DP-restriction warrants more seats or the 96 capping imposes fewer seats; 
exceptions are marked by a bullet (●). 
Fix-Proportional-Square-Root method “FPS”: 
Seats are apportioned proportionately to FPS-scores using the divisor method with standard 
rounding (Webster method), except when the 2014DP-restriction warrants more seats; 
exceptions are marked by a bullet (●).  Member State i has FPS-score 3 + 374.4pi + 249.6qi, 
with pi = Pi/P+ and qi = Qi/Q+, where Pi is the QMV-2017 population figure of state i and Qi is 
its square root, while P+ = P1 + … + P27 and Q+ = Q1 + … + Q27. 
Columns “2019” and “RR2019” 
Column “2019” shows the 2019–2024 EP composition adopted by AFCO and the EP.  Column 
“RR2019” verifies that representation ratios are decreasing when passing from a more populous 
Member State to a less populous Member State. 
Column “Increm.” exhibits the increments from “2014DP” seats to “2019” seats.  
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